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RECENT CASE NOTES
A bank can not take the benefits of an agency and not be bound by the
agent's acts and representations in securing the benefits. Munn v. Burch,
supra.
The case is undoubtedly sound and in accord with the modern tendency
of courts to consider that every agency is so far general that it must
cover, not only the precise thing to be done, but whatever usually and
rationally belongs to the doing of it. R. C. H.
WILLS-SIGNATURE IN SUPERSCRIPTION-INTENTION TO ADOPT NAME AS
SIGNATURE--Six weeks before her death Mrs. Belle Stockman, in her own
handwriting, prepared a paper which purported to be her last will. On
the day of her death she requested a nurse to bring the paper to her, say-
ing that it was her will, and desiring the nurse and another person present
to sign it as witnesses, which they did. Mrs. Stockman did not subscribe
her name, and it appeared only in the superscription, thus: "The will of
Belle Stockman." Appellees contest the probate of the will on the ground
that it was not signed as required by statute. HELD: a judgment for ap-
pellees, refusing probate, is reversed. Thrift Trust Co. v. White et al,
Appellate Court of Indiana, June 25, 1929, 167 N. E. 141. (Petition for re-
hearing denied Oct. 22, 1929.)
The statute provides that: "No will ...... shall affect an estate unless it be
in writing, signed by the testator, or someone in his presence with his
consent, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more com-
petent witnesses." 2 Rev. St. 1852, p. 308; section 3452, Burns' 1926. The
question as to whether the testator's name in his own handwriting, appear-
ing at the beginning of the will, is a sufficient signing under the statute,
is one of first impression in this state, although it long has been decided
in many jurisdictions.
After the statute of frauds, the signature of the testator became neces-
sary; its position on the instrument, however, was immaterial. Lemayne
v. Stanley (1681) 83 Eng. Reprint 545. In this case, the testator -wrote his
own will: "In the name of God, amen, I, John Stanley, make this my last
will and testament." The name did not appear elsewhere on the wil), but
the court held it to be a sufficient signing. The Indiana statute, like the
English statute of frauds, does not specify where the testator's signature
should appear on the will. Other states with statutes similar to the one
in force in this state generally have followed the Lemayne Case. The
Supreme Court of Michigan decided the question in 1922, In re Norris
Estate (Stone v. Holden), 191 N. W. 238. On a blank form the testator
had filled in his name at the beginning and in the attestation clause and
published it as his will without actually signing it on the line provided for
that purpose. This will was held to be duly executed since there was an
intention on the part of the testator to adopt his name as written by him
in the beginning of the will or in the attestation clause as his signature.
More recently this decision was reaffirmed in Michigan, when the Supreme
Court held that the superscription, "The will of Augusta M. Thomas" in
testator's own writing was a sufficient signing, no other signature appear-
ing at the end of the will. In re Thomas Estate, 220 N. W. 764.
In the case of Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538, in which the will
was written by another at the direction of the testator, but was not signed
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at the close, although the execution was attested by witnesses, the court
held the signing sufficient, and indicated a desire to follow the English
decision under the statute of frauds. A corresponding viewpoint is that
of the Maryland Court which referred to the similarity of the fifth sec-
tion of the original statute of frauds with the section of the statute gov-
erning the execution of wills. Some other states in accord are: Illinois,
Kalowski v. Fausz (1902) 103 Ill. App. 528; Mississippi, Armstrong 'V.
Walton (1913) 62 So. 173; Texas, Lawson v. Dawson (1899) 53 S. W.
64; and Vermont, Adams v. Field (1849) 21 Vt. 256. The law on this
point is well stated in 40 Cyc. 1104. "Where the statute relating to sign-
ing requires no more than the statute of frauds,--merely that the will
shall be in writing, and be signed,--it is immaterial where the testator's
signature was placed, if it was placed there with the intention of authen-
ticating the instrument."
Evidence showing the intention of the testator to adopt as his signature
the name he wrote at the beginning of the will is necessary. The inten-
tion of Mrs. Stockman to adopt the name written in the superscripture as
her signature is indicated by the fact that she thought the will was com-
plete and published it as such by requesting the two witnesses to sign it.
The court concludes that, "If the initial words, 'The will of Belle Stock-
man,' had, instead, been written at the close, who would say that it
should not be treated as her signature?"
Undoubtedly the case is in accord with the great weight of authority.
3. W. S.
